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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of tariffs on price-setting duopolists selling a 
homogeneous product. The producers cannot segment geographically distinct mar­
kets. It provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium (mixed) strategies 
and analyzes the pattern of competition for different tariffs. If a country raises its 
tariff, the profits of both producers increase, although the protected firm typically 
benefits more than its foreign counterpart. Growth in one market may reduce the 
profits of the firm located in the other market. 
Keywords: Commercial policy; Imperfect competition; Anti-dumping 
1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the effects of tariffs on an international market where 
two firms sell a homogeneous good. Each firm produces at zero marginal 
cost, and the domestic market of at least one firm is protected by a tariff. We 
emphasize two points: first, commercial policy in one market may have an 
influence in all national markets; and second, there is a limit to market 
segmentat ion when the goods sold in different countries are close substi-
tutes. 
If there is no tariff, this analysis reduces to the standard Bertrand model 
without capacity constraints. Then the only equil ibrium is for both firms to 
price at marginal cost. Even with tariffs, a similar result obtains if market 
segmentat ion is permitted: competit ion drives the price in each country 
down to its tariff. 1 We concentrate on the case without market segmentation; 
each firm must set only one price for both exports and domestic sales. This 
is equivalent to assuming that neither firm can dump its product. 2 A 
protected firm can benefit f rom a tariff only by charging a positive price for 
all sales. This permits the other firm to raise its price and make positive 
expected profits in its own market. 
Because the profit functions are discontinuous, equilibria in pure strate-
gies may not exist. 3 However ,  under reasonably general assumptions, we 
characterize a unique mixed strategy equilibrium for each pair of tariffs. 
Think of  each pure strategy as a price representing a marketing choice. 
Then a firm chooses a mix of aggressive and conservative prices. Aggressive 
prices are low enough to capture the home market with certainty, and to 
capture the foreign market with positive probability. Conservative prices 
preclude capturing the foreign market,  but they assure higher expected 
profits in the home market. 
If the tariffs in both countries are sufficiently low, both firms randomize 
using a range of aggressive and conservative prices. As the tariffs rise, the 
average prices charged by the firms also increase. For high enough tariffs, 
both firms concentrate on conservative prices, and the markets are effective-
ly segmented.  When only one country imposes a high tariff, the structure of 
the equil ibrium becomes very asymmetric, and the heavily protected firm 
mixes conservative and aggressive prices. The poorly protected firm also 
randomizes,  charging conservative prices in order to sell above cost in its 
1One can interpret these tariffs as transportation costs or compensating differentials for 
consumers with discretely different most preferred brands. Eaton  Engers (1990) and Baye 
and de Vries (1992) discuss this point. Also, almost all the literature on oligopoly in 
international economics has used the assumption of arket segmentation, ot to model 
empirical aspects of international trade, but because this assumption makes these kinds of 
models analytically tractable. We are an important exception to this tradition. 
2In the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, the United States defines dumping as charging an 
export price that is less than fair market value and that is likely to result in injury toa domestic 
industry. Fair market value is: (1) the price in the xporter's own market; (2) the price in a 
third market; or (3) the Department ofCommerce's e timate of average cost plus a markup for 
'reasonable' profits. In practice, tariffs are imposed according t  country of origin; hence, 
competition among importers with access to several national markets will entail that firms 
charge one price for sales in the world market. 
3See Dasgupta nd Maskin (1986a,b) for a systematic treatment of this issue. 
own domestic market. But a high tariff makes it impossible for the poorly 
protected firm to be aggressive since such a tariff effectively prohibits it from 
exporting. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief survey of the 
literature. Sections 3 and 4 provide a systematic derivation of the equilib-
rium. Section 5 analyzes comparative statics. It shows that an increase in the 
tariff rate of one country must increase the profits of both  firms. It also 
examines the implications of a change in the size of the market of one 
country and present wo simple examples. Then we give a brief conclusion. 
2. Some related literature 
On a technical evel, our analysis is related to the work of Levitan and 
Shubik (1972), who characterize the mixed strategy in an Edgeworth-
Bertrand duopoly. It is even more closely related to a paper by Shilony 
(1977) addressing how oligopolists et prices in a simple location model; he 
characterizes the equilibrium when demand is completely inelastic and 
countries and tariff rates are symmetric. Varian (1980) investigates the role 
of information on the equilibrium pricing strategies. 
The literature on brand loyalty is also closely related to our model. 
Narasimhan (1988) analyzes product loyalty in a model where undercutting 
one's rival by a discrete amount induces consumers to switch to a new 
brand. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) analyze a model of overlapping enera-
tions where incumbent firms have loyal customers and entrants price 
aggressively in order to build up a base of future loyal customers. Raju et al. 
(1990) analyze Bertrand equilibria in games with various asymmetric forms 
of brand loyalty, 
This paper is a major extension of these two strands of literature. 
Previous work uses the fact that each firm's profits are tied down by some 
idiosyncratic brand loyalty or informational asymmetry. Once a firm's 
equilibrium level of profits is known, it is then possible to determine the 
mixed strategy equilibrium. In our model, one cannot determine one firm's 
profits independently of those of the other firm. All of our arguments lead 
to a simultaneous determination of the equilibrium profits of both firms, 
making for a much more difficult problem than has been solved previously. 
Also, we allow for more general classes of demand functions and asymmet-
ries. Hence, the earlier analyses cannot be applied in a straightforward 
manner. 
It is only in recent years that economists have investigated market 
structure and international trade in explicitly game-theoretic models. Bran-
der (1981) shows that transport costs give rise to two-way trade if duopolists 
segment markets and choose separate quantities for domestic and foreign 
sales. Helpman (1984) discusses the importance of the assumption of 
segmented markets in models of international o igopoly. Analyzing only one 
market, Krishna (1989) shows that quotas placed on one firm in a Bertrand 
duopoly can benefit both firms. Bulow et al. (1985) emphasize the strategic 
interdependence of producers acting in distinct markets. They show that 
shocks affecting a firm's profitability in one market influence its best 
response and hence the profits of its competitors in other markets. Eaton 
and Engers (1990) examine a dynamic version of a special case of our model 
where demand is perfectly inelastic. Assuming that firms set prices in 
alternate periods, they characterize the Markov-perfect equilibria for that 
game. Baye and de Vries (1992) examine a model of international trade and 
solve for an equilibrium in mixed strategies when some of the consumers 
have brand loyalty and others do not. An extensive bibliography of game- 
theoretic issues in international trade theory is given by McMillan (1986). 
3. The model 
There are two firms producing a homogeneous good at zero marginal cost. 
Firm 1 is located in country 1, and firm 2 is located in country 2. In country 
i, there is a non-negative specific tariff, ti, on the good produced in the other 
country. The demand per consumer at any positive price p is D(p)  in both 
countries. The countries may differ in size, with ki consumers in country i. 
Firms simultaneously choose (non-negative) prices. Thus, if firm i charges 
price p, it sells its output at p in country i but at p + tj in country j. The firm 
with the lowest after-tariff price in any country captures that market. If both 
firms charge the same price in some market, then they split the market 
equally .4 
For p/>0,  let k~Tr(p)=-k~pD(p) be the profit earned by firm i in its 
domestic market when it charges the lowest after-tariff price there. Let 
kjTr*(p) k jpD(p  + tj) be the profit earned by firm i in the foreign market 
when it charges the lowest after-tariff price there. We assume that 
Assumpt ion  1. (a) ~-(0)~ limp+ 0 7r(p)= 0; (b) 7r(-) attains a unique maxi- 
mum at Pro; and (c) ~'( ' )  is continuously differentiable and concave on 
(0, pro). 
Assumption 1 implies that the marginal revenue of the domestic profit 
function is downward sloping on [0, Pm]. It also implies that the foreign 
profit function for firm i is monotone on [0, p,, tj]. 
In order to obtain a Nash equilibrium, it is necessary to permit firms to 
4 Our results are not sensitive with respect to the sharing rule. 
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randomize their choices of p. Let Gi(P) be the decumulative distribution 
function of the price charged by firm i; this function may not be continuous. 
Gi(p) is the probability that firm i charges a price greater than or equal to p. 
Let qi(p) denote the probability mass of Gi(- ) at price p. Then 
II~(p, G/) [G/(p q) q/(p t~)/2]kdr(p ) 
+ [Gj(p + %) q/(p + tj)/2]kjTr*(p) 
is the expected profit to firm i from selling at price p when the foreign firm 
follows strategy Gj. The term G~(p ti) is the probability hat firm i makes 
import-competing sales at home, and q/ (p -  t~)/2 reflects the assumption 
that the firms split market i if firm j charges p t~. Likewise, Gj(p + tj) is 
the probability that firm i makes export sales, and qj(p +%)/2 is the 
probability that both firms sell in market j. Although the expected profits of 
firm i may not be continuous in p, 
lim~0//'(P 6, G/)/>///(p, G/) ~>~0/~'(P + 3, G/) 
for p E [0, Pm] because undercutting firm j causes a discrete increase in firm 
i's expected profits if firm j charges p -  t~ or p + tj with strictly positive 
probability. 
Let v~ SUpp~> 0 II~(p, G j )  be the highest expected profit attainable by firm 
i, given that the form j follows strategy Gj. Then a pair of strategies 
(G 1, G2) is an equilibrium if 
f I I l (p, G2)dGl=Vl  and f H2(p, G1)dG2=v2 . 
Each firm's strategy is optimal since, at any price it charges, its expected 
profits are as high as possible, taking the other firm's strategy as given. 
4. Derivation of equilibrium 
In this section, we establish a series of results which lead to a characteriza- 
tion of the unique equilibrium. For the remainder of the paper, G 1 and G~ 
will refer to an equilibrium strategy pair, and v~ and o: are expected 
equilibrium profits. Throughout this section, the tariffs are fixed at t I and t 2 
and the market sizes are fixed at k 1 and k:. 
4.1. Continuity of  the equilibrium distributions of  prices 
Although the imposition of a tariff complicates the analysis by creating 
two margins of competition at any price, standard arguments for Bertrand 
= - - ­
-
-
-
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competition can still be used to establish the continuity of the equilibrium 
price distributions at any price below Pm" They also establish some relation- 
ships between the supports of the two distributions. 
Note first that the imposition of a tariff by either country guarantees a 
positive expected profit for a protected firm. Hence, the support of the 
distribution of prices chosen by that firm must be bounded away from zero. 
This in turn guarantees a positive expected profit for the other firm. 
Therefore, we may state: 
Lemma 1. If either t I > 0 or  t 2 > 0 ,  then D 1 > 0 and /')2 > 0. 
Let t t I -b t 2 be the sum of the tariffs. From now on, we assume that at 
least one tariff is positive so that t > 0. If firm i is considering charging price 
p E[t, Pro], it can always undercut by charging p - t .  Then it captures 
market j with the same probability that it captured market i at the original 
price. Hence, undercutting by t changes a conservative price into an 
aggressive one. Since t > 0, some firm may charge an aggressive price. 
Given Lemma 1, we may also establish 
Lemma 2. qj(p) >0 implies p =Pm" 
Proof. See the appendix. 
Lemma 2 implies that the distribution of prices charged by either firm is 
continuous everywhere but perhaps at the monopoly price. Charging Pm is 
quite conservative, but either firm may do so with strictly positive probabili- 
ty. Indeed, both firms will charge this price with certainty if both markets 
are perfectly protected. 
Define /~i sup{p: Gi(p) 1} and fii inf{p: Gi(p) 0}. These are the 
lower and upper bounds of the support of the strategy a i. 
Lemma 3. (a) G i ( f i i - t i )>O;  (b) Gj(~i+ tj)=O; (c) fii-ti<~,6j<-pm; and 
(d) P_i <~ !?_j + tr 
Proof. See the appendix. 
The proof of Lemma 3 uses the facts that the value of the game is positive 
for both firms and that the monopoly price is unique. Lemma 3 implies that 
the supports of the two distributions must overlap. Part (a) states that even 
an unprotected firm charges conservative prices with positive probability, 
and (b) implies that no firm charges a price so high that it loses its own 
market with certainty. Part (c) states that no firm charges a price above the 
monopoly price, and (d) shows that neither firm is so aggressive as to 
=­
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capture both markets with certainty. Since firms never charge prices outside 
(0, Pm], any tariff greater than Pm is prohibitive. Consequently, we assume 
that te ~< Pro" Lemma 3 states that a tariff anywhere in the world causes a firm 
to increase the profit rate in its own market, but no firm is completely 
aggressive in attacking a foreign market. 
4.2. Restrict ions on the equi l ibr ium ranges o f  prices 
Our next step is to determine bounds on the support of the price 
distributions. We begin by establishing an upper bound for fig. 
Lemma 4. [k j / (k  I + k2)]fi i <~ t. 
Proof .  See the appendix. 
Lemma 4 states that firm i will tend to be aggressive if market j is large 
relative to market i. Indeed, the most conservative price a firm charges is 
that at the upper bound of the support of its strategy. Since firm i could 
attack market j by undercutting by t, charging fii makes sense only if 
kifi  i >i (k 1 + k2)( f i  i -  t). Lemma 4 also states that low tariffs imply that 
neither firm charges a very high price. 
Using the assumption that p_, < fii t, we now establish a lower bound for 
Lemma 5. I f  P_i < fii t, then [ki/(k I q- k2)]fi  > t. 
Proof .  See the appendix. 
The hypothesis of Lemma 5 assumes that firm i occasionally attacks firm j 
by undercutting by t. The proof of Lemma 5 is accomplished in six steps, 
and it is quite difficult because we are dealing with fairly general demand 
functions. The first step establishes that if expected profits from domestic 
sales are increasing, then so are expected profits from foreign sales if a firm 
cuts price by t. The second step shows that if one firm undercuts by t, then 
so does the other firm. Hence, both firms occasionally attack if one does. 
The third step shows that an attacking firm will not charge prices in the 
middle of the support of the other firm's equilibrium strategy; indeed, if the 
supports of the equilibrium strategies are wide enough, these prices are 
neither aggressive nor conservative. The fourth step shows that a firm can 
then charge quite conservative prices since it need not worry about 
defending against foreign prices in the middle of its support. The fifth step 
shows that both firms occasionally charge the monopoly price, the highest 
individually rational pure strategy. Finally, the sixth step shows that a firm 
-
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can charge this conservative price even if its own market  is small. This 
contradict ion establishes that no firm attacks by undercutt ing by more than 
t, the sum of the two tariffs. 
Indeed,  we are able to demonstrate a stronger property.  
Lemma 6. fs min{p_i + t, Pro}" 
Proof. See the appendix.  
Since firm i charges prices in an interval no wider than t, Lemma 3(c) 
implies that fii is less than or equal to the min imum of {fii + t, Pm}" I f  strict 
inequality holds, then f ig -  t~ < p~ + t/. So firm j can charge prices above 
f i~-  t i and not worry about  losing sales in its own market.  But then firm i 
can earn higher expected profits at some price p > f i  since it does not expect 
to capture market  j at such a high price and it need not worry about  
compet i t ion f rom firm j at prices near f~ ti. This contradicts the definition 
of the supremum of firm i's equil ibrium strategy and establishes the equality 
in Lemma 6. 
Lemma 6 shows that monopo ly  price will be the upper bound of the 
support  of firm i's strategy if either tariff is high. Indeed,  for small t tl + t 2 
neither firm charges high prices, and it can be shown that both firms' 
equi l ibr ium strategies are (perhaps different) connected intervals of width t. 
But if either t 1 or t 2 is large, then one firm is well protected,  and it will 
charge Pm with positive probabil ity. Then the firms' equil ibrium strategies 
may not be connected. Compet i t ion for the market  of the poorly protected 
firm may occur, but here will be limits to how aggressive the protected firm 
will be. Finally, one can also show that 
Gi (P j  tj) Gi(p_ j + ti) , 
since prices in the interval ( f i / -  tj, /?/+ t~) are neither aggressive nough to 
attack the foreign market  nor conservative nough to yield a high profit rate 
in one's  own domestic market.  5
4.3. Characterizing the equilibrium distributions of prices 
In this subsection we determine v I and u2, the equil ibrium level of 
expected profits for the two firms. Then we use v / to  derive G i and show that 
there is a unique pair of equil ibrium strategies. 
5 Let firm i charge some price fi/-tj <p < ~/+ t,. Then its expected profits are lI,(p, Gj)= 
kiTr(p), since it captures market i with certainty and market j with probability 0. Since ~'(p) is 
increasing on [0, Pro], there is an e > 0 such t at II~(p + e, Gj) k~(p + e) > k~r(p); hence, 
charging price p is not optimal. 
= 
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We do so by using an iterative procedure. First, fix qi E [0, 1] and 
qi E [0, 1]. Then define the function ~bi: [0, pm]-"'>[~+ whose rule is 
~ki~r(p) + qjkj~rT(p), if 0 <~p <~Pm -- tj, 
c~i(P) [ kiTr(p ) + qjkj~r*(p m tj), if Pm-  tj <p  ~Pm- 
If p ~Pm-  tj, then q~i(P) describes the expected profits firm i earns from 
capturing its home market with certainty and the foreign market with 
probability qj. If Pm-t j<p ~Pm,  then ~bi(p) describes firm i's expected 
profits from capturing its own market with certainty at price p and the 
foreign market with probability qi at the after-tariff price Pro. It is easy to 
check that ~bi(. ) is continuous and strictly increasing, and that ~b~(O)= O.
Hence, ~b~-l( • ) exists and is also positive, continuous, and strictly increas- 
ing. 
Now let p~l) t~, V~ 1) k l ' r r (p~l ) ) ,  p~l)  (~ll(O(ll)) + t2 and v~ l) 
k27r(p~l)). The value v~ 1) is what firm 1 can achieve simply by pricing at its 
tariff rate and capturing its own domestic market with certainty. Since firm 1 
can assure itself v~ 1), its most aggressive price will be no lower than 
¢b~-~(v(~l)). But then firm 2 can assure itself v~ ~) simply by charging p~l)= 
~b~-1(v(11)) + t 2 and capturing its own domestic market with certainty. 
This insight allows one to define a sequence of values. In particular, for 
n~>l,  iE{1 ,2} ,  jE{1 ,2} ,  and i~ j ,  let 
p<-+n . <n+l) , min{~b/l(v) ")) + t,, Pm} and u~ ki 'n'(pln+l)) .  (a) 
o(n+l) Since both ~bTl( • ) and ~-(- ) are increasing, { i }n=l is a non-decreasing 
sequence of positive numbers bounded from above by k~Tr(pm) for i 
{1,2}. Hence, for each pair (qi, q j )~[0,  1] x [0, 1], this sequence con- 
.(n+l) verges. Let v~(q~, qi)=l im,~=v~ . One can show that vi(q~, qj) is 
continuous and non-increasing in both its arguments. 
51(v i (q i ,  Now let pi qi))" Since Lemma 6 implies that fii min{p~ + 
t, Pro}, we can use the convenient notation: 
fi~(q~, qi) min{ck/~(vi(qi , qi)) + t, pro}. 
Since Gj(p__i + t]) Gj(fi~ ti), v i (q,  qj) and vj(q~, qi) are indeed the values 
of the game as long as vi(qi, qj)=qikizr(f i i(qi, q])) and vj(q~,qj)= 
q~kjrr(fij(q~, qi))" We will now show that such a pair exists. 
Since vi(qi , qi)<.kiTr(pm) and O<fi~(q i, q~)<~Pm, we can define a map- 
ping q0: [0, 1] × [0, 1]---~ [0, 1] × [0, 1] whose rule is 
Cp( q~, qi) [v~(q~, q~)/ki~(15i( qi, q~)), vj( q~, qj)/kjTr(fi~( qi, qj))]. (2) 
Because v~(- ,- ), ~b~-l( • ), and 7r(. ) are all continuous, so is ¢ ( . , .  ). Since 
qo(. , . )  maps [0, 1] x [0, 1] into itself, it has a fixed point. Using the 
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concavity of 7r(. ), it is possible to show that qO(. ,. ) is decreasing in each of 
its arguments. Hence, this fixed point is unique. 
Let (q~, qj) be the fixed point of qO(. ,. ). We will now show that this fixed 
point is the equilibrium for the game. A big advantage of the iterative 
procedure described in (1) is that it gives a method for computing the value 
of the game for any list of parameters. We can now state our most important 
result. 
Theorem 1. Fix k l ,  k2, t 1, and t 2. Then there is a unique equi l ibr ium. 
(a) For smal l  t t i + tj, the equi l ibr ium strategy for  f i rm i is 
I 1, i fp<p_ i ,  v j /k j~(p  + tj) , if P_i P <~ P-j tj , 
G~(p) ~vj/kj~r(f i j )  , if fij tj < p < p_j + t~ , 
/ [v j  - kjTr(p - t~)] /k j r~(p - t i ) ,  if p_j + t, ~<p ~<Pi, 
I~0, if/5~ < p ; 
(b) For large ti and small tj, the equilibrium strategies are 
I 1, if p</~i ,  vj /k jTr(p + t j ) ,  if P_i <~P ~Pm -- tj , 
G i (p )  Iv J /k j~(pm) .  if Pm tj <p <~Pm, 
[0 ,  if Pm <p ; 
I 
1, i fp</~+t j ,  
Gj (p)  [v i -  k i l t (p -  t j ) ] /k /T r* (p -  t j ) ,  if/~i + tj<~Pm <~P' 
[0 ,  if Pm <P ; 
and 
(c) For large t i and large tj, the equilibrium strategies are 
{~,  i fp~<P, , ,  
Gi (p)  , if Pm < P 
Proof .  The existence of the equilibrium follows from a straightforward 
extension of Theorem 5(b) in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a). Let 
G/(p ,  + tj) G~(15, t , )  q /  , 
where (qi,  qj) is the fixed point of the mapping defined in (2). Then the 
uniqueness of the pair (v 1, 02) follows from the arguments above showing 
that q~(- ,. ) has only one fixed point. We will now verify that these strategies 
do indeed constitute an equilibrium. 
=­
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Consider case (a). I fp  </~j, then Gi( p + t~) > [v i kf l r (p)] /k i~r~(p),  so it 
pays for firm j to raise its price. If /~i <p < fir tj, then p + t i/>/~ and 
Gi( p + t~) O. Hence, if firm j charges p E [E~, fir tr], it captures market j 
and only market j with probability Gi(p  tr) vr /kf l r (p ), giving expected 
profits v r. If p E (fir - tr, g-r + t~), then Gi( p - t~) < vr/kr~r(p ) and firm j 
should lower its price; further, Gi( p + tr) > [v r k f l r (p ) ] /k j r~(p)  and firm j 
should raise its price. If/~r + ti ~<p ~/?~, then p t r <p_i and G~(p tj) 1. 
So if firm j charges p E [P_3 + ti, fi~], it captures market j with certainty and 
market i with probability G~(p + ts) [vj kf lr(p)]/kgTr~(p), again yielding 
expected profits v r. If p >fir, then G~(p tj) < v Jk f l r (p ) ,  so firm j makes 
higher expected profits by lowering its price. 
Consider case (b). The only difference now is that t~ is so high that firm j 
no longer finds it profitable to sell abroad. If firm i charges a price p <pi ,  
then Gr( p +t r )>[o  i -k i l r (p ) ] /k j l r * (p ) ,  so it pays for firm i to raise its 
price. Of course, neither firm charges above p,,. Also, if firm j charges 
p </~ + t r, it wins its own market with certainty but its profit rate is too low. 
The fact that expected profits are constant on the support of each firm's 
equilibrium strategy follows as in part (a). 
Consider case (c). Both firms charge the monopoly price with positive 
probability, and neither firm has expected profits in its foreign market. [] 
Theorem 1 establishes the patterns of competition illustrated in Fig. 1. 
This figure is drawn for two equally sized markets with perfectly inelastic 
demand where each monopoly price is 5; it uses the tariff pairs given in 
Table 1 below to determine the exact upper and lower bounds of each firm's 
equilibrium strategies. The bold line segments indicate the support of the 
firms' equilibrium strategies. Here is how to interpret he figure. Consider 
the strategy for firm 1 depicted in Fig. l(a). The arrow from firm l's support 
to firm 2's prices indicates that any price 1.41 <~p ~< 2.41 attacks the foreign 
market at the after-tariff price p + 1; such a price is aggressive because it 
captures the home market with certainty and the foreign market with some 
positive probability. Any price 2.41<p~<3.41 is conservative. Also, any 
price 3.41 <p loses the domestic market with such high probability that it is 
not optimal to charge it, while any p < 1.41 earns too low an expected profit 
to be optimal. Since t I t 2 1,  these results are symmetric for firm 2, and 
the arrows from firm 2's support o firm l's prices indicate analogous effects 
for firm 2. 
Part (a) of Theorem 1 corresponds to Fig. l(a) and Fig. l(a'). For low 
tariffs, the strategies have connected supports that are bounded away from 
the monopoly price. A high tariff gives rise to increased protection of the 
domestic market and leads to higher profits. Both firms still compete for 
both markets, but firms charge prices near the monopoly price. Fig. l(a') 
represents the case in which/~i + t >Pm and ~j + t > p,,. For firm 1, any price 
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Fig.  1 :  The  suppor ts  of  the equ i l ib r ium strategies.  (a) t I 1 and  6 1; (a ' )  tj 2 and  t 2 2; (b) 
t~ =3 and t 2 1; (c) t 1 =3 and t 2 =3.  
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Table 1 
The relation between profits and tariff rates: k 1 k 2 1, Pm 5 
tx t2 /~1 ~2 /~ /~2 u~ u 2 
1 0 0.84 0.54 1.84 1.54 1.54 0.84 
1 1 1.41 1.41 3.41 3.41 2.41 2.41 
2 0 1.68 1.09 3.68 3.09 3.09 1.68 
2 1 2.20 1.95 5.00 4.94 3.95 3.21 
2 2 2.32 2.32 5.00 5.00 4.32 4.32 
3 0 2.39 1.57 5.00 4.57 4.57 2.39 
3 1 2.50 3.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.50 
3 2 2.50 4.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.50 
3 3 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
2.32 ~<p ~< 3 is aggressive since there is no chance of imports from firm 2 and 
there is a positive probability of exporting to the market of firm 2. On the 
other hand, any price 4.32 ~<p ~<5 is conservative because firm 1 has no 
probability of exporting and has a positive probability of suffering from 
imports into its own market. Again, the interpretation for firm 2 is 
analogous because the tariffs are symmetric. 
Part (b) of Theorem 1 describes the equilibrium when one country 
imposes a much higher tariff than the other. It corresponds to Fig. l(b). 
There is a high tariff in country 1, and firm 1 captures its own market with 
certainty even at the monopoly price. However, the domestic market of firm 
2 is less protected. Consequently, firm 1 sometimes charges aggressive prices 
in an attempt o capture both markets. Now, for firm 1, a price 2.5 ~<p ~< 4 is 
aggressive because these prices attack firm 2's market and represent a 
positive probability of exports. The broad band at price 5 indicates that firm 
l 's equilibrium strategy has a mass point at the monopoly price. For firm 1, 
charging p =Pm 5 is conservative because it will not be able to export. For 
firm 2, a price 3.5 ~<p ~< 5 is conservative; in equilibrium, it does not export 
to firm l's market because t I is high enough so that undercutting firm 1 is no 
longer profitable. The dashed line in the figure shows that firm 2 would have 
to charge such a low price that the forgone expected profits in its own 
market are not worth the increased expected profits from exporting. This 
case is, of course, highly asymmetric. 
Part (c) of Theorem 1 describes the equilibrium when both countries' 
tariffs are high enough to segment he markets. It corresponds to Fig. l(c). 
Each firm captures its own market at the monopoly price, and tariffs are so 
high that neither has an incentive to compete for the foreign market, a fact 
that is illustrated by the two dashed lines in the figure. Now both firms are 
conservative in fully protected omestic markets. 
= = = 
= 
5. Comparative statics 
In this section we examine how equilibrium profits change with the tariffs 
and the sizes of the markets. We show that an increase in either tariff 
decreases the profits of neither firm. We conclude by presenting simulations 
illustrating the comparative statics of the model; these results show that a 
larger world market may decrease the profits of a protected firm. 
Theorem 2. (a) If t t i + tj is small, then an increase in either tariff increases 
the equilibrium expected profits of both firms; (b) if ti is large and tj is small, 
then an increase in ti has no effect on the equilibrium expected profits of 
firm j, although an increase in tj does increase firm j's expected profits; and 
(c) if both t~ and tj are large, then an increase in either tariff has no effect on 
either firm's equilibrium expected profits. 
Proof. First note that vi(qi, qi) is differentiable because 7r(. ) and hence 
~bi-l( • ) both are. We will show: (a) Ovi/Ot i and Ovi/Ot j >0 for small t t i -t- tj; 
(b) bvj/Otj>O and Ovj/Oti=O for large tg and small ti; and (c) Ovg/Otj= 
Ov~/Otj =0 for large t~ and large tj. Note that cases (a), (b), and (c) of 
Theorem 2 correspond to the analogous cases of Theorem 1. 
Consider case (a) of Theorem 1, and recall the definition ofpl  n+l) given in 
Eq. (1). Since ti + t i is small, it follows that pl n+l) is increasing in t~ as long 
as p l  n+]) <Pro" Hence each vl "+I) is increasing in t~, and the limiting value of 
that sequence is also increasing in tg. Likewise, v~ "+~) is increasing in tj. But 
_(n+l )  . (n+l )  kiqr(pln+l)), the then so is /~i min(6fl(v~ ")) + ti}. Since u i 
limiting value of this sequence is also increasing in tj. 
Consider case (b) of Theorem 1. Then kiTr(pm): -k iTr(p i )+ kjTr*(p_i). 
This expression is independent of t i, and it implies that p~ does not depend 
on t~. Since vj kjTr(/~i + tj), v i is also independent of t~. However, since 
~-(. ) is increasing, avj/Otj > 0 as long as vj < kj~(pm).  
Consider case (c) of Theorem 1. Small changes in t~ and tj have no effect 
on the equilibrium strategies. [] 
Case (a) of Theorem 2 shows that an increased domestic tariff benefits the 
domestic firm because it increases the chance that the home-country firm 
captures its own market. Because of the increased protection, the domestic 
firm becomes less aggressive, reducing the competitive pressure on the 
foreign firm. Consequently, an increase in the home-country tariff also 
benefits the foreign firm, as long as the foreign firm has some probability of 
exporting to the protected omestic market. Case (b) shows that if a high 
home-country tariff perfectly protects the domestic market in equilibrium, 
then any further increase of the home-country tariff will not benefit the 
= 
= 
= = 
= 
foreign firm, although an increase in the foreign tariff may raise its expected 
profits. Case (c) states that the tariffs eventually become so high that they 
segment he two markets; any further increase has no effect on either firm. 
Table 1 illustrates how the equilibrium is affected by the two tariffs, again 
for the case of perfectly inelastic demand and symmetric markets. Lemma 6 
implied that/% =/~i + t whenever fi~ <Pro. Therefore, at price pj tj firm i 
just captures its own market but never the foreign market, resulting in an 
equilibrium profit of k i ( f i j  t i ) .  The table is also consistent with Theorem 2, 
which states that an increase in one tariff always increases the profits of both 
firms unless the monopoly profit has been reached. In fact the profits of the 
domestic firm generally rise more than proportionately with the tariffs. This 
occurs because ach firm is less aggressive and profits are a linear function of 
price in this example. Fig. 1 above is drawn from the data in Table 1. 
Table 2 illustrates how the profits change as the size of the market in 
country 2 changes. We assume qual tariffs now, but the per capita demands 
are as before. Notice that firm 2 always benefits from an increase in the size 
of its own market. However, the profits to firm 1 begin to fall with an 
increase in the size of its foreign market. This drop reflects the increased 
competition for the larger market. A firm can always guarantee itself the 
profits from selling at the tariff in its own market; hence, an increase in the 
size of its own domestic market raises a firm's equilibrium profits. But a firm 
whose export market is disproportionately large will become aggressive; 
hence, the other firm must charge conservative prices to protect its own 
large market. Then the aggressive firm's prices fall and so do its equilibrium 
profits. 
The limiting cases illustrate these ideas forcefully. Let the population 
k I 1 and let k z, the number of consumers in the second market, converge 
Table 2 
The relation between profits and relative market size: k~ 1, t I t 2 1, p,, 5 
k2 Pl P2 Ol U2 
0.09 3.14 2.17 1.17 0.19 
0.49 3.51 2.90 1.90 1.22 
0.81 3.50 3.29 2.29 2.01 
1.00 3.41 3.41 2.41 2.41 
1.15 3.33 3.48 2.47 2.69 
1.24 3.29 3.50 2.50 2.83 
1.38 3.21 3.52 2.52 3.05 
1.62 3.09 3.53 2.53 3.38 
2.06 2.90 3.51 2.51 3.92 
2.96 2.65 3.42 2.42 4.90 
5.10 2.39 3.28 2.28 7.08 
11.50 2.17 3.14 2.14 13.50 
-
-
= 
= = = = 
to zero.  6 Then,  applying the algor i thm in (1), we see that lim/,2~oV 1 t 1 and 
limkz_,OV2=0. A lso ,  the equi l ibr ium strategies satisfy l im~2~O/~l=t l ,  
limk2~O/51 rnin{t I + t, Pro}, limk2~o/Z2 0, and limk2_~o fi 2 rain{t, Pm}" 
Hence ,  firm 2's most aggressive strategy approaches  pricing at marginal  cost 
as its own market  shrinks; firm l ' s  most aggressive strategy becomes 
charging the tariff rate in its own market .  
Now let k I 1 and k 2 be large. Then v 2 will also be large, and firm 2 will 
charge prices no greater  than t 2 with arbitrar i ly  high probab i l i ty ]  Since the 
highest pr ice firm 2 will charge is near  t 2, in equi l ibr ium, firm 1 can earn 
approx imate  xpected profits t t I + t 2 by charging a conservat ive price in 
near  t. F i rm 1 need not fear that firm 2 will lower its price because gains 
f rom sales in firm l ' s  small market  do not offset lost revenues from sales in 
firm 2's large home market .  These two examples  i l lustrate precisely what  it 
means  to be a small country in this model ;  a large-country firm worr ies 
about  losing its domest ic  market  and charges its own tariff with high 
probabi l i ty .  The smal l -county firm takes the world price as given and 
occas ional ly  reaps rents in its own (doubly protected)  domest ic  market .  
Tab le  2 shows numerical ly  how the shift in the pattern of compet i t ion is 
re lated to the di f ference between fil and fi2. If  country 2 is small ,  this 
d i f ference is near ly equal  to the tariff, and firm 2 tries to capture the larger 
foreign market .  On the other  hand,  if country 2 is large, the re lat ion 
between fil and fi2 is essential ly reversed.  Now both firms compete  for the 
domest ic  market  of firm 2. F i rm 1 becomes more  aggressive, and firm 2 is 
conservat ive,  accruing high profit rates in a large domest ic  market .  8 
6. Conclusion 
We have analyzed a model  of pr ice-sett ing duopoly  in which each firm 
may be subject  to a tariff. If  dumping is prohib i ted,  the imposit ion of a tariff  
6We need to consider a sequence of such markets because q~-~(. ) is not single-valued if
k 2 0. 
7 Theorem 1 implies that no firm i has expected equilibrium profits greater than H~(p, Gi) 
k~(pm) ,  the expected profits in a perfectly protected domestic market. Hence, although k2 and 
v z are arbitrarily large, v~ is bounded. Now let e > 0, and assume that Gz(t 2 + e) > 0. Then firm 
1 can charge p e, earning arbitrarily large expected profits. This contradiction establishes that 
firm 2 almost surely charges prices no greater than t 2. 
8 The astute reader might ask why the values in Table 2 are not symmetric, in the sense that 
(ol/kl)/(o2/k2) be a constant. Because t I t 2 1 and demand is perfectly inelastic in both 
markets. Theorem 1 implies that v I =/~2 + 1 and v 2 k2(/~ x+ 1). Hence, vl /v 2 (1/k2)(p 2 + 
1)/(~ 1 Jr- 1). As  k 2 grows large, firm 2's most aggressive strategy rises to t2, while firm l's most 
aggressive strategy becomes arbitrarily near zero. Hence, (vl/kl)/(VE/k2) (/~2 + 1)/(/~1 + 1) 
increases. Of course, this result depends upon the functional form assumed for demand in each 
market. 
= 
= = = 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= = 
= = 
= 
in one market influences the strategies of both firms in both markets. 
Although price setting by two firms producing a homogeneous good is a 
simple model of imperfect competition, introducing tariffs has quite complex 
effects. Moreover, these effects cannot be captured by a model with 
differentiated goods because such an analysis allows implicitly for market 
segmentation. It is surprising that our simple model has so complex a 
solution, but the interpretation of the equilibrium strategies as mixtures of 
conservative and aggressive marketing policies is compelling. 
This analysis howed that commercial policy in oligopolistic markets may 
have unexpected effects. In particular, to the extent that producers make 
strategic hoices involving sales in international markets, the imposition of a 
trade restriction aimed at one firm in one market influences the choices of 
all firms in all markets. Tariffs do not have to be as large as the monopoly 
price to be prohibitive. Also, when one firm has a perfectly protected 
market, a marginal change in the commercial policy of its trading partner 
has no effect on the protected firm's expected profits. Finally, an exogenous 
increase in the size of one's export market may have beneficial effects on 
domestic consumers because it induces a domestic firm to be more aggres- 
sive in the face of a foreign tariff. 
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Appendix 
Proof  of  Lemma 2 
Suppose q j (p )>0.  Then there is a 6 >0 such that Gi( p - t j  +6)= 
Gi( p tj) and Gi(p + t i + 6) Gi(p + t~). Since Lemma 1 implies that 
vj > 0, it follows that G~(p - tj) > 0. Further, i fp <Pm -- ti, then Assumption 
1 implies that both ~r(p) and 7r*(p) are increasing. I fp  E [Pm -- ti, Pro], "rr(p) 
is still increasing, but Gi( p + t~ + 6)= 0 so firm j never captures market i. 
Therefore, unless p Pro, there is 6 > 0 such that the expect profits of firm j 
are higher at p + 6 then at p. [] 
- = 
= 
Proof of Lemma 3 
(a) Suppose @(fii ti) 0. Then atp near ,6 i, the expected profits of firm 
i are near zero, contradicting Lemma 1. 
(b) At any p > fii + tj, the expected profits of firm j are zero• Further, if 
qi(fii) > 0, then firm j can increase profits by charging a price just below 
ff i  + tj.  
(c) The first inequality follows from (a). We establish the second inequali- 
ty by reversing subscripts in (b) and noting that firm j never captures market 
i at price Pi or higher. Any increase in price lowers the probability that firm 
j captures its own market. Since profits per customer are maximized at Pro, 
the result follows. 
(d) At any p </? / -  ti, firm j captures both markets with certainty. Since 
profits are increasing in both markets for p <pm -- ti, firm j never charges 
price below E i -  ti. [] 
Proof of Lemma 4 
Lemma 3(b) implies that if firm i charges ,6i, it never captures market j. 
Now suppose firm i charges p just under ,6 i t. Then it captures market j 
with the same probability that it would capture market i at fii and the 
probability that it captures its home market increases. Since D(p) is 
decreasing, firm i's expected sales increase by at least  factor of (k I + k2)/ 
k i. Hence, it is profitable to charge fii only if k i f i  i (k I + k2) ( f f  i t). [] 
Proof of Lemma 5 
We establish the lemma in a series of steps. Let I I~(p, Gj)= kiGj( p 
• f ti)Tr(p ) be firm i's expected profit from domesttc sales and Hi(p, Gj) 
kjGi(p + tj)rr*(p) be analogous for foreign sales. 
G )>O Step 1. Suppose p <~p" ~Pm t. Then Ha~(p " + t, Gj) >t 1I i (p + t, 
implies rlf(p", Gj) > rlf(p', Gj) 
Proof. Suppose II'~(p"+ t, Gj) >/n~(p '  + t, G) > 0. Then Gj(p"+ tj)~r(p"+ 
t) >! Gj(p' + tj)Ir(p' + t) > O. Then Assumption 1 implies that 
Gj(p" + t j ) /@(p'  + tj) >1 ~r(p' + t)/rr(p" + t) >! Ir(p' + tj)/Ir(p" + tj) 
+ tt  It :~ I It [(p' + t j)=7(p')/p']/[(p"+ tj)rri(p )/p l >~ rri(P ) /=, (P  ) ,  
where the second inequality is strict if t /> 0 and the last inequality is strict if 
tj > 0. Since t t i + tj > 0, the result follows. [] 
Step 2. I f  ~i + t < fii , then p_j + t < fi ti fij and p_i + t < fi tj <~ fii. 
Proof. Since v i IIi(fii, Gj), it follows that 
- = 
-
~ ­
-
' -- " ' 
= ~ 
= 
- ~ ­
= 
0 ~</Zi(,6. Gj) -/Zi(P_i + t, G)  
[nd(fi i ,  Gj) - / /~ . (e ,  + t, G,)] 
+ k j lG j (P i  + t j ) I r * (p i )  G j (e i  + t + t j ) ' r r * (e  i + t)]. 
Since Lemma 3(b) implies that Gj(f i ,  + tj) 0, it follows that Hdi ( f i i ,  @)  
HT(p_ i + t, Gi ) />0.  Because 0<pj  <~fii and Lemma 3(c) implies that f ig -  t~  <
Pm -- t, it follows from Step 1 that Ilif(fii - t, G j )  > H[(p~,  Gj ) .  Then 
0 >-/7,.(fi i - t, Gj) //~(e,, @) / /Y( f i ,  t, (7/.) d - I> - - Hi (P_i, Gj) 
k i lG j (p i  t t i )vr(f i  , t) Gj(p_ i t,)Tr(P_i)]. 
Since fii - t >/~i, Assumption 1 implies that Gj(f i i  - t - te) < 1. Hence,  p_j + 
t<f f i -  t i. Lemma 3(c) implies that f i~-  t i ~</Sj. Since the label i was 
arbitrary, the conclusion that /~j + t < fij immediately implies that ~i -{- t < 
f i  t j ff i. 
Step 3. I f  p_i + t < fii, then Gi(f i j  t~) <~ Gi(idj + t + ti) and Gj(f i i  ti) 
G(P_, + t + tj). 
Proof .  The result is immediate if fii tj ~> p_j + t + t i. So let p (fij t 
tj, p_j + ti). Note that Step 2 implies that p >p j .  Since Ei is in the support of 
Gi, 
0 >1 H i (p ,  @)  Hi(E, , Gj) 
d f -// i(gi, Gj ) ]  [// i (p ,  G~) _11 , (e , ,G j ) ]+[1 - t i (p ,  , 
f k, [ ,n ' (p)  ,n-(e,) ] + Hi( p, Gi) -11[(p_i, G,) 
> H[ (p ,  G j )  f hi(p_,,  G j ) ,  
where we have used Assumption l. Note that p < ~.j + t i <~ P_i - t <~ pm --  t, 
where the second inequality follows from Step 2 and the third from Lemma 
3(c). Then 
/ / / (p  + t, @) - / /~(e ,  + t, Gj) 
[[Idi(p + t, G j )  I ldi(ei + t, G/)] + [ I I [ (p  + t, G j )  Hi(el f  + t, G/) l 
< H[ (p  + t, G j )  FI[(!?_i + t, @)] 
k f lG j (p  + t + tj)~-,*. (p  + t) @(/~/+ t + tj)~-*(/~/+ t)] ,  
where the inequality follows from the contraposit ive of Step 1. But p + t + 
tj >/6  i implies that G/(p + t + #) 0 and hence H,.(p + t, Gj) < IIi(t?_~ + 
t, Gj). Hence,  it is not optimal for i to charge p (fit tj,/~i + t + ti). Then 
the result follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that the label i was arbitrary. 
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Step 4. I f  p_~ + t < fii, then fi~ >i min{pm, P_i + 2t}. 
Proof .  The result is immediate if fi~ 1>/~ + 2t. So let p (fi~, p_~ + 2t). Since 
Lemma 3(b) implies G~(fii + tj) 0, it follows that 
o >i n , (L ,  c j )  k , [G j (p  a (L 
Lemma 3(a) and Step 3 imply that 0 < Gj( f i  - ti) <~ Gj(p__i + t + tj) <~ G j (p  - 
ti), where the last inequality is true because p </~ + 2t. Hence, ~r(p)~< 
7r(fi,). But Assumption 1 then implies that/~i =Pro- [] 
Step 5. I f  P_i "~ t < f~, then Pl fie Pm" 
Proof. I f /~ + t < f~, then Step 2 implies that/2_1. + t < fj.  Lemma 4 implies 
that/5 k<~ 2t for some firm k. Then Step 4 implies that Pm ~< 2t. But then Step 
4 implies that Pi Pro" 
Step 6. I f  p i + t < ~,  then (k~ + kj)t  <~ k i f  ~. 
Proof .  Note that 
o n , ( f .  c j )  + t, c j )  
k i [G j (P i  t i) ' l ' l ' (pi) G j (p  i Jr- t ti)'lT"(p_i + t)l 
+ k j [G j (P i  + t j ) ' r r* ( f i i )  G i ( t2  i + t + tj)'n'*(p__ i + t)]. 
Lemma 3 implies that Gj(f~ + t j)= 0 and that Gj ( f i -  t i )> 0, and Step 3 
implies that Gj(fii ti) Gj(l?_i + t + tj). Since P_i + t < fi~ and G(. ) does not 
increase, Gj(fi~ t~) Gj (p  i + t ti). Therefore, kizr(fi~) >! k~zr(~_~ + t) + 
kjzr*(e i + t), which is equivalent to k~fi~D(fi~) >ik~(p_ i + t)[D(gi + t) + 
k jD(12 ,+t+t j ) ] .  Steps 2 and 5 imply that p_~+t+t j~f i=f i j - - - - -pm,  and 
Assumption 1 ,entails that D(p)  is not increasing. Hence, k~f~(k  I + 
k2)(~ i -F t). Since Lemma 1 implies that p_~ > 0, Lemma 5 follows. [] 
Proof  o f  Lemma 6. Since gi / ) i  t, Lemma 3(c) implies that/5 i ~< min{P_i + 
t, Pro}. Suppose that strict inequality holds. Choose p E (fi~- t i, min{p_i + 
tj, Pm-  t~}). Firm j earns higher profits at p than at any price in the interval 
(fi~ ti, p) because it captures market j with certainty and it never captures 
market i. So firm j never charges a price in (,6 i t~, p). But then firm i earns 
higher profits at p + tj than at fii because Lemma 3(b) implies that it never 
captures market j, while the probability that it captures market i remains 
unchanged. This argument contradicts the d finition of/~. [] 
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